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On Charles J. Brainerd (1978) The stage question in cognitive-developmental theory. BBS 1:175-213.
Abstract of the original article: The term "stage" appears to be used in three general senses in theories of behavioral development:
(a) as a metaphor: (b) as a description of behaviors that undergo age change; (c) as an explanation of age-related changes in
behavior. Although most existing stage models are purely descriptive, a few of them purport to have explanatory power. One
such model, Piaget's stages of cognitive development, is considered in this paper.
To be viewed as potentially explanatory, a stage model must describe some behaviors that undergo age change, posit
antecedent variables believed to cause the changes, and provide procedures whereby the behavioral changes and the antecedent
variables can be independently measured. Piaget's stages seem to satisfy some but not all of these requirements. Piaget's stages
describe many age-related changes in behavior, and some antecedent variables have been proposed. However, procedures do
not exist for measuring the two factors independently. In lieu of such procedures, Piaget has outlined a "program" of five
empirical criteria whereby the reality of his stages can ostensibly be verified. Some objections to these criteria are considered.
The five criteria in Piaget's program are invariant sequence, cognitive structure, integration, consolidation, and equilibration.
Three of the criteria (invariant sequence, integration, and consolidation) lead to the same sorts of empirical predictions
(culturally universal sequences in the acquisition of certain behaviors). Such predictions are subject to the objection that
Piagetian invariant sequences are often measurement sequences. A measurement sequence is said to occur when some
later-appearing behavior consists of some earlier-appearing behavior plus additional things. The cognitive structure criterion is
subject to at least three criticisms: First, it yields, at most, descriptions of behavior; second, these are often nothing more than
descriptions of task structure; third, they cannot be regarded as unique to the given stages for which they are posited. The fifth
criterion, equilibration, generates some predictions that might be considered as prima facie evidence for the existence of stages.
However, these predictions conflict with the current data base on Piaget's stages.
It is concluded that there is no compelling support for Piaget's hypothesis that his cognitive stages do more than describe
age-related changes in behavior. Since explanatory statements involving stages appear with some regularity in Piagetian and
neo-Piagetian writings, there are grounds for supposing this conclusion to be nontrivial.
From the study of psychological stages to the
understanding of the processes involved in
the cognitive development of child and pupil
Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont
University of Neuch&tel, Switzerland and Facult6 de Psychologie et des
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Piaget's theory and procedure: An approach derived from
biology. Piaget and his collaborators study the development of
intelligence by considering it to consist of the construction of a
set of mental operations allowing the individual to adapt to his
environment.
This approach - as Piaget himself has often suggested - is
profoundly inspired by the biological perspective from which it
was born. It has adopted some of that perspective's features,
particularly the interest in the forms that the organism takes
during its development. We suggest that this kind of interest is
revealed in the attention that Piaget has devoted to describing
the different stages of elaboration of cognitive structures. In
Piaget's perspective the stages of development must be charac-
terized by forms (that is, structures) of thought.
Let us state immediately, since Brainerd (1978a; 1978b) adds
to his critique of the notion of stages a reflection on its
pedagogical implications, that Piaget originally investigated the
problem of knowledge as a biologist and epistemologist and not
as an educator. It seems that from the beginning Piaget consid-
ered himself an observer and not someone committed in the
way an educator is. Consequently he was not inclined to take
into consideration - nor, hence, to evaluate - the eventual
consequences of an educational commitment.
From the study of forms (and stages) to that of processes.
We can note, however, that just as the science of biology, in
exploring experimental possibilities went beyond its initial
interest in simple observation of forms to attempts to unravel
the processes at work, so have Piaget and his collaborators,
who during the last decade seem to have abandoned the
description of stages and their characteristics in order to study
the processes at work in development. They have described
these processes in terms of autoregulation and equilibration
(Inhelder, Sinclair & Bovet 1974; Piaget 1975).
We agree with these authors that the study of the processes
at the origin of intellectual growth is essential to understanding
its forms - and its eventual stages. This is why, in this
commentary, we will not be concerned with Piaget's approach
to the description of stages but with what seems to us a more
fundamental problem: Piaget's view of the mechanisms that
produce such stages. Let us recall that Piaget presents the
stages he describes as "universal," as something like a cognitive
developmental characteristic of the human species; he does not
seem puzzled by the possible ethnocentric biases in the fact
that the intercultural studies conducted by his school always
seem to show a developmental superiority of urban middle-
class occidental children compared to their peers of other social
backgrounds. This is attributable, we believe, to Piaget's
conception of the impact of social factors on cognitive growth:
in Piaget's theory social factors may facilitate or slow down
development, but they cannot directly enhance development.
The experimental study of this question, we believe, could
open the way to a better understanding of the nature of
operational thought.
A process presently neglected by Piaget's experimental work:
Social Interaction as a causal factor of development. In their
recent work, Piaget and his collaborators present the cognitive
development of the child as arising essentially from the pro-
cesses of autoregulation built into the subject as well as from
© 7982 Cambridge University Press OUO-525XI82IO2O259-93I$O6.OOIO 259
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0001178X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:45:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Continuing Commentary
the dynamics of the structures themselves. But in various
experiments we have conducted during these last years we
have obtained data revealing a reductionistic aspect to this
conception: Indeed we have shown that it is primarily when a
cognitive conflict is socially experienced that important cogni-
tive restructuring can be observed (Doise, Mugny & Perret-
Clermont 1975; Perret-Clermont, Mugny & Doise 1976;
Perret-Clermont 1980; Mugny, Perret-Clermont & Doise, in
press). Precise comparisons of different experimental condi-
tions have shown that it is mainly when two individuals with
two different points of view are brought to interact on the same
task (or to solve the same problem) that the necessity to
coordinate actions (or points of view) emerges and provokes a
sociocognitive conflict between the partners. This sociocogni-
tive conflict gives rise to new cognitive elaborations, the
consequences of which are noted on two levels: that of a
collective performance superior to individual performance and
that of subsequent progress at the level of the operational
structure of the individual's thought.
The cognitive conditions of this conflict seem to have been
relatively widely studied (see, for instance, Inhelder, Sinclair
& Bovet 1974; Kuhn 1972; Lefebvre & Pinard 1972; 1974;
Perret-Clermont 1980). But little is known of the social
conditions of this conflict; these should be important to study,
for, in our opinion, it is not at all evident that all sociocognitive
conflicts (or conflicts in general) are always necessarily resolved
by operational restructuring: other solutions are possible, such
as nonperception or avoidance of the conflict, compliance with
the other's point of view, submission, and so on. Under what
social conditions is a sociocognitive conflict at the basis of an
intellectual elaboration of the operational type? The answer to
this question could help us understand how "universal" the
cognitive structures described by Piaget are.
What are the social necessities that induce subjects to
elaborate an operational solution to their sociocognitive con-
flicts? Research presently being carried out with some col-
leagues (Dionnet, Jacq, Levy) suggests that the social rele-
vance of a situation for the child can facilitate his cognitive
structuring of the task and of the notions involved.
We mentioned previously that an understanding of the
processes responsible for cognitive growth could lead to better
comprehension of the forms into which they develop. If such is
the case, it should be possible to formulate this last question
within the framework of a debate on "stages." And this we will
try to do here.
The examination of the question of stages: The operative
structures described by Piaget would be the product of specific
social Interactions relative to tasks whose characteristics would
seem to be perceived differently according to the level of de-
velopment of the individuals concerned. Brainerd suggests
that the operational structures to which Piaget refers are in fact
merely "task descriptions." But then how can one explain that
we arrive at a particular description of the task? Is this
description trivial and immediately evident for all individuals?
Brainerd does not propose any other description of the tasks
concerned. Is this type of operational description of the task
self-evident to the adult? But then how are we to explain that
what is evident to the psychologist does not seem to be evident
in the same way to the young child he is questioning (at least
until a certain age, which varies according to cultural context)?
Our question then becomes, What are the interindividual
relationships that lead the child to elaborate the behaviors that
Piaget calls "operational"?1 The answer to this question is
important for optimizing pedagogical strategies.
Educational relevance of the issue. By definition, the
educator is always in a situation of social interaction with his
students. Therefore it is one of his duties to examine to what
extent the modalities of social interaction that he imposes upon
them (and that he induces them to experience among them-
selves) are sufficient to induce - or to inhibit - cognitive
elaborations. Can he observe that the students progress in
their understanding of the task he proposes? If the educator
wanted to make that observation by referring to Piaget's stages
it is evident that he would be using an instrument that is
inadequate because it is too global. But his observations he
could make as Piaget did. It seems to us that Piaget's construc-
tivist and interactionist approach, if it takes into consideration
the role of the social context in which the child develops, could
help us understand not only how to choose the moment for an
educational intervention but also how to define the type of
intervention and how to modify it according to its results.
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NOTE
1. Are all the behaviors of this type elaborated simultaneously or is
it a question of parallel - or independent - development? This is the
main question in the present debate on "decalage" which would
certainly be clarified by an identification of the causes of development.
Author's Response
Task descriptions and circularity
Charles J. Brainerd
Psychology Department, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario,
Canada N6A 5C2
In the first-round BBS treatment of the stage problem,
the soundness of Piaget's particular stage model was
questioned. For the most part, my objections were
theoretical rather than empirical: It was argued that
Piagetian statements of the form "children do x because
they are in Stage S" are circular because no provision is
ever made for the independent measurement of x and S
(Brainerd 1978b); it was argued that the model's key
predictions - culturally universal sequences in concept
development - are untestable because of measurement-
sequence confounds (Brainerd 1978a; 1978b) and
measurement-error confounds (Brainerd 1978a; 1979);
and last, it was argued that the "cognitive" structures
that are supposed to define Piagetian stages are, at most,
descriptions of behavior, and often are only task descrip-
tions; they cannot be regarded as unique to the particu-
lar stages they are said to define.
The Perret-Clermont commentary is not much con-
cerned either with these criticisms or with others raised
in previously published commentaries. Indeed, the
principal intent of the remarks seems to be to draw
attention to some recent learning research by the author
(Perret-Clermont 1980), research whose connections to
the stage problem are obscure. The only criticism that
Perret-Clermont rebuts is the one about cognitive struc-
tures, and I should like to respond briefly to these
comments.
As I have mentioned, the original critique of cognitive
structures turned on three points. In her commentary,
Perret-Clermont attempts to neutralize the objection
that Piagetian cognitive structures are mere task descrip-
tions. Since I found this rebuttal somewhat elliptical, I
quote it before replying:
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Brainerd suggests that the operational structures to
which Piaget refers are in fact merely "task descrip-
tions. " But then how can one explain that we arrive at a
particular description of the task? Is this description
trivial and immediately evident for all individuals?
. . . Is this type of operational description of the task
self-evident to the adult? But then how are we to
explain that what is evident to the psychologist does
not seem to be evident in the same way to the young
children he is questioning?
To begin with, the first sentence in this quotation is in
error. I did not say that Piagetian cognitive structures
are "merely 'task descriptions.'" What I said (Brainerd
1978b, pp. 177-78) was that they are merely behavioral
descriptions. I added that there are certain structures,
such as the concrete-operational groupements, which
have no known behavioral referents. In these cases, of
course, the structures are nothing more than a descrip-
tion of the structure of some task. However, the impor-
tant issue is not that Piagetian structures sometimes
reduce to task descriptions. Instead, it is that since they
are at most descriptions of behavior (and remarkably
abstract descriptions at that), these structures cannot be
regarded as satisfactory explanatory constructs. Thus,
Perret-Clermont's commentary appears to miss the
point.
Although the premise is wrong, it is nevertheless
instructive to consider the other statements in the
quotation, because they reveal an astonishingly Platonic
view of what is sound evidence for a theoretical con-
struct. As I said, I am not sure that I fathom their
meaning. Perret-Clermont seems to be claiming that the
fact that we can articulate the structure of some task -
by, for example, translating it into the language of
abstract algebra or symbolic logic - is, somehow,
grounds for inferring that such structures are in the
head. For Perret-Clermont, then, the fact that humans
can sometimes effect descriptions of the structure of
certain aspects of their environments demands explana-
tion in terms of cognitive structures. This is Platonism
with a vengeance. The fact that, cognitively speaking,
humans do certain things, in this case describe aspects of
their environments in rather abstract language, evi-
dently demands explanation. But since it is something to
be explained, an explanandum, to suggest that it vali-
dates some particular explanation is just more of the
circular reasoning that was criticized in the target article.
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On Michael C. Corballis and Michael J. Morgan (1978) On the biological basis of human laterality: I. Evidence for a
maturational left-right gradient; II. The mechanisms of inheritance. BBS 1:261-336.
Abstract of the original article, Part I: In this paper, we consider human handedness and cerebral lateralization in a general
biological context, and attempt to arrive at some conclusions common to the growth of human laterality and of other structural
asymmetries. We suggest that many asymmetries appear to be under the influence of a left-right maturational gradient, which
often seems to favor earlier or more rapid development on the left than on the right. If the leading side is damaged or restricted,
this gradient may be reversed so that growth occurs with the opposite polarity. A mechanism of this sort appears to underlie the
phenomenon of situs inversus viscertim et cordis, and the same principle may help explain the equipotentiality of the two sides of
the human brain with respect to the representation of language in the early years of life. However we must also suppose that the
leading side normally exerts an inhibitory influence on the lagging side, for otherwise one would expect language ultimately to
develop in both halves of the brain. Examples of an inhibitory influence of this kind can also be found in other biological
asymmetries; for instance, in the crab Alpheus heterochelis, one claw is normally greatly enlarged relative to the other, but if the
larger claw is removed the smaller one is apparently released from its inhibitory influence and grows larger.
Although this account does not deny that the right hemisphere of humans may be the more specialized for certain functions, it
does attribute a leading or dominant role to the left hemisphere (at least in most individuals). We suggest that so-called
right-hemisphere functions are essentially acquired by default, due to the left hemisphere's prior involvement with speech and
skilled motor acts; we note, for instance, that these right-hemisphere functions include rather elementary perceptual processes.
But perhaps the more critical prediction from our account is that the phenomenon of equipotentiality should be unidirectional:
the right (lagging) hemisphere should be more disposed to take over left-hemisphere functions following early lesions than is the
left (leading) hemisphere to take over right-hemisphere functions. We note preliminary evidence that this may be so.
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